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Abstract. This report discusses work conducted within a broader project that is con­
cerned with the development of an open computational environment for e-contracting. 
We investigate the need for hypothetical nonmonotonic reasoning in e-contracting, 
where, realistically, agents possess incomplete knowledge about their environment and 
other agents. The questions we seek to address, in such environments, are: whether it is 
possible for agents to identify appropriate assumptions dynamically; how these as­
sumptions affect subsequent inferences; and what happens when new information that 
becomes available at some time point confmns or disproves assumptions made at pre­
vious times. We propose the representation of contract norms as default rales that are 
constructed dynamically from an initial contract representation in some temporal logic, 
e.g. in Event Calculus. We argue that a representation of contracts as Default Theories 
is suitable for temporal, hypothetical and nonmonotonic reasoning. Specifically, we 
propose a technique that can be used for theory construction and, subsequently for 
temporal hypothetical nonmonotonic reasoning, which enables the dynamic and ad hoc 
identification of candidate assumptions, without resorting to proof, and hence computa­
tionally viable. We use a full example of a contract and illustrate via examples the way 
this technique addresses all three issues of interest and supports the execution and 
performance monitoring of e-contracts.
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1 Introduction
This report discusses work conducted within a broader project that is concerned with 
the development of an open (in the sense of Hewitt [33]) computational environment, 
populated by software agents, whose interactions are regulated by electronic agree­
ments, i.e. e-contracts. Such interactions may concern business transactions, collabo­
rative distributed problem solving, task and resource allocation problems etc. Agents 
in such environments will need to be able to monitor their interactions with other 
agents against the contracts that they are involved in, in order to determine what ac­
tions to perform and when. This means that an agent will need to establish at a given 
time point, the state of its transaction with other agents, in order to check and regulate 
its own behaviour with respect to the commitments it has assumed towards other 
agents, and plan its activities accordingly. Specifically, the agent will need to estab­
lish:
(i) Factual information, given a history of events that have occurred up to the point 
of its query. For instance, an agent for an e-commerce application may need to 
establish what facts are true of orders, payments, deliveries etc., that have oc­
curred (who caused such events, when, whether they were carried out success­
fully and so on).
(ii) Prescriptive information, given a history of events that have occurred up to the 
point of its query. That is, an agent needs to know what obligations, permis­
sions, prohibitions and legal powers are active for itself and each other agent in 
its environment.
To answer such queries some kind of temporal reasoning and reasoning about ac­
tions and their effects is required. Many researchers (for example, [46, 6, 20, 65] 
among others) have adopted Event Calculus (EC) [40] for contract representation. 
However, the historical information available to an agent at the time point it poses its 
query may be incomplete, for various reasons: Information may be lost, or distorted 
by noise, and in a truly open system, where agents join or leave the system at differ­
ent times, information delivery from agent to agent may simply be delayed. In order 
to reason in the presence of incomplete historical knowledge, agents must be able to 
fill in information gaps, by employing assumptions about the past and the present 
time. When new information becomes available, possibly rendering some of these 
assumptions false, agents must be able to retract previously drawn conclusions, that 
is, conclusions inferred on the basis of these assumptions. In other words, agents need 
to reason nonmonotonically. Moreover, agents may need to establish potential future 
states of their transactions with other agents, i.e. to anticipate factual and prescriptive 
information, in order to plan their activities accordingly; in these cases, agents will 
need to be able to employ assumptions about the future. The problem of assumption- 
based reasoning has been explored by many researchers within the Artificial Intelli­
gence community and the main distinction between their proposals concerns the na­
ture of assumption identification. Static approaches to assumption identification are 
clearly inappropriate in the context of open systems, since it is unrealistic to expect 
that each agent developer will anticipate all potential situations in which the agent 
will find itself, in order to determine in advance potentially useful assumptions that 
the agent might use for its inference. Therefore, what is required is a dynamic ap­
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proach to assumption identification. Finally, the identification of an appropriate as­
sumption by an agent must be such that it is consistent with the agent’s current defi­
nite knowledge about itself, the environment and the other agents that populate it. To 
establish whether a given assumption meets this requirement, one might be tempted to 
resort to proof. However, proof is notably computationally hard, and this is exacer­
bated by the fact that the environment is open, and hence the agent’s current knowl­
edge is subject to frequent changes.
Inspired by the syntax and semantics of Default Logic (DfL) [63], we present a 
way in which an agent, given a temporal representation of an electronic agreement, 
may construct all possible relations between what it knows and what it may assume, 
that are implicitly defined by the agreement. It turns out that this space is, in fact, a 
lattice, and at any particular time point the agent may position itself on it, given the 
explicit knowledge that it currently possesses, i.e. without resorting to proof. Once the 
agent has positioned itself on this lattice, it finds out what assumptions are related to 
the node it occupies and may employ them in its reasoning. As the agent’s knowledge 
changes over time, and consequently as its assumption needs change, the agent re­
positions itself on the lattice by moving on it from node to node. We use the notion of 
consistency and extension derivation for Default Theories (DfT) provided by [5], 
which does not require logical proof. Nonmonotonic reasoning is achieved by the 
agent changing its position on the lattice.
In section 2 we introduce an e-contract example scenario and illustrate the need for 
hypothetical nonmonotonic reasoning in open computational environments, without 
reference to some specific temporal logic. In sections 3-5 we propose the representa­
tion of contract norms as default rules [63], This representation may be constructed 
dynamically from an initial contract representation in some temporal logic, and dis­
cuss the ways in which this representation of contracts as Default Theories (DfT) is 
suitable [24, 26], Section 6 discusses the full representation of an e-contract, specifi­
cally in Event Calculus. In section 7 we note the problems that are raised by previous 
approaches on e-contracting and hypothetical/nonmonotonic reasoning and discuss 
the technical aspects of our approach in more detail. Finally, section 8 summarizes 
our conclusions and directions for future research.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Example Scenario
For the purposes of illustration consider a 3-party business transaction that takes 
place in an electronic marketplace populated by software agents. A buyer agent (ba) 
communicates with a seller agent (sa) and establishes an agreement with it for pur­
chasing a certain product. Consequently, sa communicates with a carrier agent (ca) 
and establishes another agreement with it for the timely and safe delivery of goods to 
BA.
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The first agreement (between BA and sa) is to be conducted on the following terms: 
sa should see to it that the goods be delivered to BA within 10 days from the date ba’s 
order happens, ba, in turn, should see to it that payment be made either in cash on 
delivery or within 21 days from the date it receives the goods at an additional cost. 
The agreement may specify sanctions and possible reparations in case the two agents 
do not comply with their obligations, but we do not need to refer to them explicitly 
here. In the same spirit, the second agreement (between sa and ca) specifies obliga­
tions, deadlines and possible sanctions/reparations in case of violations.
Figure 1 E-contract Transition Diagram
Following [14], we may take an informal, process view of the business transaction 
that is regulated by the two agreements. Each state offers a (possibly partial) descrip­
tion of the factual and normative propositions that hold true in it. A transition be­
tween states corresponds to an event that takes place, i.e., an action that one of the 
parties performs or omits to perform. Part of such a description of the business ex­
change as a state diagram is shown in Figure 1. Initially, at time point to, the transac­
tion is in state SO where the two agreements have been established and no events have 
occurred yet. If ba places an order at some time after to, the transaction will move to a
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state si, where sa is obliged towards ba to deliver goods within 10 days. Also, ca’s 
obligation towards sa, to deliver goods to BA on sa’s behalf within 10 days, is active. 
If ca delivers within the specified time bounds, then the business exchange will move 
to a state S2, where ca’s obligation (and sa’s obligation towards the ba for delivery, 
which is related to it) is successfully discharged, and ba’s obligation towards sa to 
pay becomes active (as does sa’s obligation to pay CA). If, when the transaction is at 
state Si, CA does not deliver on time, then the transaction will move to some state S3, 
where sa must compensate ba as specified by their agreement (and ca must compen­
sate SA as specified by their agreement). In the same manner we may discuss other 
states of the business exchange.
2.2 The need for assumptions in open environments
Note that reasoning in open environments with incomplete knowledge involves three 
issues of interest:
1H. What assumptions are applicable to fill in information gaps, i.e., what can be 
assumed by an agent to be tme or false at different time points?
2H. What is the relationship between assumptions and new knowledge, i.e. how do 
the adopted assumptions affect future inferences, either enabling some or dis­
abling others?
3H. What happens when new information becomes available, i.e., how does new 
information affect previously drawn conclusions?
To answer the first question (1H) the agent seeks to establish which norm condi­
tions it knows about, and which it needs to assume. In an open environment, norm 
conditions may dynamically become known or unknown to the agent. Thus, we see 
that the first issue calls for a mechanism that enables agents to identify appropriate 
candidate assumptions dynamically. In order to answer the second question (2H) the 
agent needs to employ some way that commits its reasoning to specific assumptions. 
Finally, in order to answer the third question (3H) the agent needs to employ some 
kind of nonmonotonic reasoning. The need for reasoning nonmonotonically in legal 
domains is strongly argued in many research papers, i.e., [66, 18, 9, 32, 58] among 
others.
We can think of two reasons why it is useful for an agent to be able to reason hy­
pothetically, by establishing appropriate assumptions dynamically. First, an agent can 
not know the future, yet it may need to plan its future activities on the basis of hy­
potheses that concern the future, i.e. on the assumption that certain events or other 
agents’ actions will occur, or that certain causal relations will be effected in the envi­
ronment, or that a certain normative relation (obligation, permission, prohibition, 
power) will obtain between itself and other agents. For example, suppose that ba 
orders from sa at time point τ (το<τ<τι). A reasonable query that ba might have is 
“When will I, potentially, have to pay for this order, assuming all goes well and I 
receive the goods in due time, so that I plan to have adequate available funds?” To 
derive an answer BA needs to perform best-guess reasoning based on assumptions.
Second, an agent may not know everything about the past and present, i.e., the his­
tory of its environment, other agents and itself so far, yet it may need to plan its ac­
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tivities on the basis of hypotheses that concern the past and present, i.e. on the as­
sumption that certain events or other agents’ actions have occurred, or that certain 
normative relations have obtained between itself and other agents. Consider the case 
where, at time point T2, BA does not yet know that ca has performed delivery, still it 
needs to plan its business activity so that it may be able to fulfill an obligation to pay 
sa in due time, should it later be informed that ca delivered at τ (τι<ϊ'<Τ2). This situa­
tion corresponds to no-risk reasoning, i.e., an agent should be able to derive a conclu­
sion even though this is based on assumptions, because alternatively it might find 
itself in an undesirable situation. It is, therefore, clear that an agent should be able to 
establish potential conclusions on the basis of assumptions.
In the next sections we present a technique to reason nonmonotonically on the ba­
sis of assumptions that are identified and employed dynamically when needed. We 
believe that the ability of an agent to identify candidate assumptions dynamically is 
inherently related to the degree to which it is autonomous (cf. [29]), hence autono­
mous dynamic assumption identification is central to our proposal and sets it apart 
from other approaches to dynamic assumption-based reasoning. However, there are 
application domains where full, uncontrolled, agent autonomy is not appropriate. As 
we shall see shortly, our proposal affords ways to control assumption identification 
and deployment, should this be desirable.
3 e-Contracts as Default Theories
We propose a representation of e-contracts as default theories for various reasons: 
Default Logic is arguably the most notable formulation for default reasoning (cf. [5, 
41]) and addresses general issues, such as negation by default, the frame problem and 
causal reasoning, satisfactorily [41]. Also, it is suitable for prototypical, no-risk, and 
best-guess reasoning, all of which interest us [5], Moreover, among all approaches to 
default reasoning, such as Close World Assumption, Circumscription, Default Logic, 
Logic Programs and Defeasible Logic, the syntax of DfL affords an intuitive way to 
represent separately what is known from what is assumed during the inference proc­
ess, and to relate a conclusion to the knowledge and assumptions used in its infer­
ence. This is due to the fact that DfL rale schemata comprise three distinct parts, 
representing prerequisites, assumptions and conclusions separately.
A default rule (henceforth default) has the form:
P : Jn/C,
where p is the prerequisite, J={Jn,J2,... J„) is a set of justifications, and c is the derived 
consequent. The semantics of this rule is: If p holds and the assumptions of j are con­
sistent with the current knowledge, then c may be inferred. A DfT is a pair of the 
form (w, D), where w is a set of propositional or predicate logic formulae that represent 
currently available knowledge, and D is a set of defaults. A default is applicable to a 
deductively closed set of formulae EaW, iff p=e and -\JiiE,...,-\JnaE. The set E is the 
extension of the DfT. The notion of extension is the most complicated concept of 
Reiter’s DfT because it is hard to determine an accurate belief set for which justifica­
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tions should be consistent. In Reiter’s initial paper for DfL [63] three important prop­
erties of extensions are noted. Specifically, an extension E of a default theory (w, d): 
o should contain w.
o should be deductively closed, and
o for a default rule of the form P: Jn/C, if PeE and -ui....^jneE then CeE.
The requirement that the extension of a default theory be deductively closed is 
computationally problematic. Therefore, we derive extensions in the manner pre­
sented by Antoniou in [5]. Antoniou proposed an operational definition of extensions 
and an incremental technique for their computation, by maintaining syntactically 
consistent sets of formulae, whose conditions part (prerequisites and justifications) is 
interpreted conjunctively and the conclusions part (consequent) is interpreted disjunc­
tively, as in sequent calculus. Thus, an agent that derives conclusions on the basis of 
assumptions, by applying defaults, constructs the extension of its grounded DfT in­
crementally.
Let π represent a default reasoning process by recording the order in which de­
faults from D apply. At each step i of the reasoning process, i.e. after the application 
of each default P:J1, j2,...,Jn/c, the extension computed is a set of ground sentences 
in(i)=!n(i-i) u {C}, and the set of assumptions employed, which should not turn out to be 
true, is Out(i) = Out(i-I) \_> {—.J1..., -Jn}. As a result, Π(ί)= Π(ί-1) >_> {Di I Di is the default rule which 
applied at step i}. Initially in(0)=w, Out(0)=s3 and n(O)=0 for i=o. The default reasoning process 
Π(ϊ) is successfiil iff in(i) n Out(i)= 0, otherwise it is failed. Moreover, the process Π(ί) is 
closed iff every default rule that belongs in the D set and is applicable in in(i) already 
occurs in n(i) According to [5] a set of formulae E is a DfT extension, if there is a 
closed and successful process Π(ί) of the DfT such that E=in(i).
For illustration purposes, consider the default theory (W, D), with w={A} and D con­
taining the following defaults:
DI =A : B/C
D2 = true:-D/E
The process n(2)={Di,D2}, i.e. in(2)={A,c,E} and out(2)={-’B,D}, is successful and closed 
and thus it is considered as an extension of the theory.
Now, consider the default theory (W, D), with w={A} and D containing the following 
defaults:
DI = A : B/C 
D2 = true : D / -·Β
The process n(2)={Di,D2}, i.e. in(2)={A,c,-’B} and Out(2)={-'B, -Ό}, is closed but not suc­
cessful and thus it is not considered as an extension of the theory. The process 
Π(ΐ )={D2}, i.e. in(i)={A,-’B} and Out(i)={-O}, is successful and closed, since Di does not ap­
ply, and thus it is considered as an extension of the theory.
Hence, DfL affords a natural means to relate a conclusion to the grounds that sup­
port its inference (in the sense of argumentation [57]), that is, to the knowledge and
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assumptions that are used in order to derive it. This is particularly useful in the con­
text of questions (2H)-(3H): Extension derivation reflects the ways in which an infer­
ence made at some time point affects subsequent inferences; in the case of non­
monotonic reasoning, should some assumption turn out to be false, it is possible to 
trace any inferences made on its basis and retract them.
For the purposes of simplicity consider an open norm-governed environment 
populated by agents, in which some temporal logic is employed, for instance Event 
Calculus [40]1. Initially e-contract norm are represented as sentences of the form:
υ<-χ,λΧ2/·.... ».x„ (1)
where y and x, (1 < i < k) are first-order logic positive or negative literals and all vari­
ables are universally quantified. This representation employs the predicates of the 
temporal logic augmented with some special predicates to denote normative relations 
(obligation, prohibition, permission, power). We view normative relations as proper­
ties that are initiated or terminated by the occurrence of agents’ actions or events. The 
norms that can be expressed in such a representation take the form, for example 
“agent Agent2 is obliged/permitted/prohibited towards agent Agenti to perform action 
Action2 by time Time2, if agent Agenti performs action Actioni, at time Timei ”, The initial 
representation of an e-contract may be characterized as a triple (H, R, A). H corresponds 
to historical information and is a possibly empty or incomplete set of domain- 
dependent definitions for currently available information, i.e. H is a set of proposi­
tional or predicate formulae representing events that have occurred and facts that 
holds. R corresponds to domain-dependent causal information and is a possibly empty 
or incomplete set of sentences of the form (1). a is a non-empty set of sentences of the 
form (1) expressing the domain-independent knowledge [24, 26],
A contract norm of the form (1) may be mapped to any one of the following de­
fault rules [24]:
ΧιλΧ2λ... λΧ* : true / Y (assumption-free default rule)
Χ,λΧ2λ. .. λΧ* : Y / Y (normal default rule)
Χ,ΛΧίΛ.,.ΛΧ*., :X*/Y 
X-jaXja... aX^ ; Xk-i / Y
Χ2λ...λΧκ:Χι/Υ 
Χ1λΧ2λ...λΧ*2:Χκ-ι, Χ*/Υ 
ΧιλΧ^λ.,.λΧκ-ι ; Xk-2i Xk/ Y
1 In section 6 we see the full contract representation in Event Calculus. Here, we discuss the 
issues that interest us, without reference to any specific temporal logic.
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Χ2λ...λΧ*., : X,, X»/Υ
true : X,,X2l...,X|,.2, Xu-ι, XWΥ (kowledge-free default rule)
That is, each initial norm that involves k conditions may be mapped to any one of 
2k+l defaults. The question that arises for the agent that seeks to establish autono­
mously which assumptions are appropriate in order to fill in information gaps is tan­
tamount to the question “which one of the 2k+l defaults should be chosen and em­
ployed in the inference procedure”, for each of the norms in the initial set of norms.
An e-contract can be represented as a DfT $ (w, D) by translating/reformulating its 
initial representation. For an agent constructing the DfT, the question that arises is 
which of the 2k+l defaults should be chosen and employed subsequently during its 
inference procedure. The construction of w and D sets is carried out as follows [26]:
The currently available knowledge w is constructed from the domain-specific part 
of the initial contract representation. Specifically, w is a copy of h, the possibly empty 
or incomplete historical information of the initial contract representation which con­
tains all currently available knowledge about what holds and what happened.
The set of defaults D of the theory is constructed from the domain-independent 
definitions of the initial representation and domain-dependent definitions for causal 
relations. Specifically, D is constructed from sets A and R which contain sentences of 
the form (1) as follows: The conclusion of each such sentence is mapped to the con­
sequent part of each default, while its conditions may be mapped to the prerequisite 
or the justification part of each default, depending on what information is defined in 
the initial knowledge base h.jR: conditions that can be derived from HuR are mapped 
to the prerequisite, while conditions that cannot be derived from HuR are candidates 
for assumptions, and are mapped to the justifications. That is, each initial axiom of 
the form (1) does not correspond uniquely to a default. Although this may seem un­
settling, it affords an agent flexibility in the construction of the DfT, as it can identify 
the set of candidate assumptions for its reasoning, dynamically, depending on the 
knowledge it possesses.
The formal characterization of the construction of the DfT is as follows: An e- 
contract is the pair (W, D), where w = H and D contains, for each definition 
(Υ<-Χιλ... AXn)eAuR, (possibly semi-grounded) defaults of the form ρ,λ...λΡ„ : j,,j2i... j„ / c, 
such that m+n=k and p,= suBSTfe, x,) if HuRhsubst(9, x,), j,= subst(8, x,) if HuRm-subst(9, >9, 
and finally c = subst(8, y).
One may argue that the DfT construction in this way, suggests that an agent may 
get trapped in an endless procedure trying to prove formulae from its knowledge 
base, in order to decide whether to use these formulae in the prerequisite or the justi­
fication part of each default rule; in other words, the agent needs to attempt to prove 
formulae (and fail in doing so) in order to decide which of these are candidate as­
sumptions. In order to overcome this limitation, we now describe a computationally 
viable procedure by which an agent may also determine assumptions dynamically and 
consequently construct the DfT. This technique does not require the agent to attempt 
to prove formulae from its current knowledge base, and therefore, is suitable for im­
plementation [25, 27],
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top level Ik)
P3,1={}
J3,1={Xl,X2,X3}
C3,1=Y
all
assumptions
One may think of the 2k possible defaults for one contract rule as organized in a 
lattice structure of height (k+i) such as the one shown in Figure 22. Each level of this 
structure contains one or more of the 2k defaults, depending on the number of as­
sumptions that these defaults employ, i.e. the binary relation that causes them to be 
partially ordered is the number of assumptions employed. Level 0 (the ground level) 
contains the single, justification-free, default, level 1 contains the k one-justification 
defaults, and so on, until the top level (the penthouse) which contains the single, 
prerequisite-free, default [27],
This structure may be traversed either bottom-up or top-down causing the p and J 
sets to contract (shrink) or expand accordingly. An agent trying to choose the appro­
priate formulation for a norm, given its current knowledge, traverses the structure 
upwards starting from level 0, and in this case, at each level i computes that p, = PM-{X| 
| Xj is not known explicitly} and J, = JM u {X) | Xj is not known explicitly}, where isjsk and Osisk. If i =0, 
then p0 = p and J„ = 0. An agent that receives new information, which necessitates the 
retraction of previously drawn conclusions, traverses the structure downwards, start­
ing from some level m (this is the level of the norm formulation that it employed in its 
reasoning before it received the new information) and in this case computes at each
2 For the moment we omit the normal default rule. We discuss normal defaults separately in 
section 4.1.
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level (i-1) that p,., = p, υ {X, | Xj is retracted} and J,., = Ji - {X, | X| is retracted}, where isjsk and 
o<ism. If m=k, then p»= 0 and j.
To illustrate this idea, schematically, consider the following norm, which involves 
three conditions:
R = Υ<-Χ,λΧ2λΧ3
The corresponding lattice structure of height 4 is shown in Figure 2 where each 
level contains the following defaults3:
Level 0: {D„., ■ Χ,ΛΛ: true / Y}
Level 1: {D, i ■ x,x2: x3 / Y. Di,2 = Χι,Χί : Xs / Y, D,.3»X2,X3:Xi/Y}
Level 2: {d2., = x, x2l x3/ y, QMsXatX,, Xj/γ, D^aX^X,, X^Y}
Level 3: {Dj., = true: χ,ΛΧ, / Y }
Dtevei,number denotes the level of the default and its identification number within its 
level, and it is used to facilitate reference.
In Figure 2, the assumption space expands, and the corresponding knowledge base 
contracts, when the agent moves upwards in the lattice structure. Conversely, the 
assumption space contracts and the corresponding knowledge base expands, when the 
agent moves downwards.
Of course, contracts (and normative systems in general) contain multiple rales, 
each of which may be formulated as a default, and candidate default formulations are 
organized in a structure, such as the one described above. Hence, the DfT e-contract 
representation is a pair of the form (W, D), where w is considered as already shown, 
and D contains the set lattices, each containing the possible formulations of a contract 
rule as a default. Note that, although the corresponding rule mapping is one-to-many, 
only one default for each initial contract rule may finally be employed for inference.
During its reasoning, the agent will need to remember which default formulation it 
chose for each of the contract norms that it reasons with, i.e. it needs to remember 
which node it chose for each of the lattices, in order to be able to answer question 
(2H). Moreover, as its reasoning progresses and new information becomes available, 
either merely augmenting its knowledge base, or updating some part of it, the agent 
will need to update its choice of default formulations, moving upwards or downwards 
within each lattice structure. Upward moves correspond to the agent trying to answer 
question (1H), while downward moves correspond to the agent trying to answer ques­
tion (3H).
The inference process starts from the ground level, by applying as many defaults 
as possible given the agent’s current knowledge. Each time a default applies its con­
clusions are included in the current extension that is being computed. When there are 
no further defaults that can be applied in a level, this signals that further assumptions 
are needed in order to proceed and inference continues by examining defaults that lie 
in the next level upwards. Note that the case where reasoning is possible using only
3 Note that, in the sequent calculus setting, the comma to the prerequisites part of the default 
should be thought of as an "and".
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rules from the ground level is identical to inference in classical logic, but here we are 
also able to preserve consistency of entailment if we accept variations of DfL, such as 
Constrained Default Logic [67],
To illustrate the reasoning process, consider this example: let us assume that a 
normative system comprises two norms of the form.
ri * Y,<xrc<j and R2=y^XsaX^
Thus, the corresponding lattices levels contain the defaults:
Lattice for ri :
Level 0: {Di0., = x,,x2: true /Y, }
Level 1: {Di,.,aX, :X2/Y,, diusX2:x,/y, }
Level 2: {D12., * true: χ,,χ^ Y, }
Lattice for R2:
Level 0: {D20.,h X3.X4.X5: true / Y2 }
Level 1: {D2,., ■ Xj.X.: Xs / Y2, D2,,2 a Χ3Λ: X4 / Y2, D2,,3 » Χ,,Χϋ : X3 / Y2 }
Level 2: {D22,, sX3 . X4.X5/ y2, D22.2 = x^ Xj.Xs/y;, D22,3 B x5 x3: x* / y2 }
Level 3: {D2j., = true: X3, X», Xs/ Y2 }
Here are some possible scenarios, with different initial knowledge available each 
time, in tire beginning of the reasoning process:
o if w = in(0) = {X,, x2} and Out(O) = 0 then extension in(2) = {x,, x2. ,y,, y2} is computed by 
making the assumption that X3, x, and Xs hold (Out(2) = {^x3, ^x,, -.Xd) and by apply­
ing defaults Di0.i and D23i, respectively.
o if w = in(0) = pc,, x2, X3} and Out(O) = 0 tlien extension in(2) = {x,, x2, X3, y,, Yd is com­
puted by making the assumption that X4 and x5 hold (out(2) = {-x,, -.x5}) and by ap­
plying defaults Di0., and D22., respectively.
o if w = in(0) = {X,, X3, X», X5} and Out(0) = 0 then extension in(2) = {X,, X3, x*. Xs, Y,, Yd is 
computed by making the assumption that only x2 holds (out(2) = HXd) and by ap­
plying defaults D20i, and Dl,., respectively.
Note that although a level may contain two or more defaults that correspond to the 
same initial contract rule (e.g. D2,., or D212 or D21i3) there is no need for some kind of 
prioritization amongst them. If two or more defaults of the same level, which are 
derived from the same initial rule, were to apply simultaneously, then the more gen­
eral default contained in the immediately lower level should have applied. Thus, the 
dilemma of the form which default to apply (e.g. D2,., or D2,.2 or D2U) signals an error in 
the reasoning procedure and that rule D2„,, should have applied first. Moreover, be­
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cause inference involves one lattice level at a time in a step-wise manner, the agent 
employs the fewest possible hypotheses.
4 Discussion
4.1 Normal Default Rules
So far, we have omitted normal defaults from the discussion about the way in which 
an agent may construct its default theory. Normal defaults have the form pc/c, i.e., 
their justification coincides with their consequent. Two questions seem to arise natu­
rally [27]:
(i) Should the agent include normal defaults in tire set of potential mappings that it 
constructs from the initial e-contract representation? And, if so,
(ii) In which level of the lattice should normal defaults be placed?
It seems to us that normal defaults are required only in order to ensure that there is 
at least one extension of the knowledge that the agent possesses, which may be com­
puted by assimilating new information, provided that consistency is preserved. The 
normal default may be viewed syntactically as belonging to level 1 of the lattice, in 
that it involves one assumption, yet this assumption is different in nature from the 
other ones, i.e. the normal default is different semantically from the other level 1 
defaults. That is, the normal default may be viewed as behaving similarly to the justi­
fication-free default, in that all its prerequisites should be satisfied by the current 
knowledge base; the only additional assumption made in the case of the normal de­
fault concerns the consistency of its conclusion with the current knowledge base. For 
this reason, although the normal default contains a single assumption, and should 
therefore belong to level 1 of the lattice, ‘operationally’ it belongs to level 0, since its 
assumption is not genuinely about something that holds in the world.
Hence, it seems to us that ‘operationally’ an agent may either omit normal defaults 
totally from the lattice structures that it constructs, or it may include them in level 0, 
instead of the assumption-free default shown above, when it is important to ensure 
that the agent will compute at least one extension, while preserving consistency. In 
this case, J„ = {Y}, and the defaults of the higher levels of the lattice will be semi- 
normal, i.e. of the form P:JaC/c, i.e., all its justifications implies its conclusion. If the 
lattice structure is constructed so that the normal default is placed in level 0 and semi­
normal defaults lie in higher levels, then the agent will verify the consistency of a 
future world before it actually proceeds with inference, i.e. it will be more cautious.
4.2 Sceptical/Credulous reasoning
DfL enables us to reason with incomplete knowledge, by deriving conclusions that 
are based on consistent assumptions, which may be retracted later, in the presence of 
new information. There are two approaches to performing such inference. In the first
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one, the sceptical reasoning mode, a formula is entailed by a default theory, if it is 
derived by all its extensions. This is a strict approach and requires the computation of 
all possible extensions, and subsequent check to determine if a formula belongs to all 
of them. This mode of reasoning is useful when an agent needs to plan its future ac­
tivities at some time point, on the basis of hypothetical information about the history 
so far. In the second approach, the credulous reasoning mode, a formula is entailed 
by a default theory, if it is derived by at least one extension. Such an approach is 
useful in order to support the agent’s decision making when norm violation or con­
flicting obligations arise. To perform either sceptical or credulous reasoning, we need 
essentially to compute all possible extensions of a default theory. However, this is not 
computationally viable, and so we adopt the operational definition of extensions of 
[5], as explained above, which produces incrementally the extensions organized in a 
tree structure. To perform sceptical and credulous reasoning on this structure is tan­
tamount to checking the offsprings of a node.
4.3 Managing the Space of Hypotheses
So far, we have argued that agents must resort to assumptions in order to reason in 
the presence of incomplete knowledge, and we have shown a way in which they may 
be able to identify candidate assumptions and employ them dynamically. We have 
shown that the space of possible hypotheses available to an agent is essentially infi­
nite, since it treats any literal that it does not know about explicitly as a candidate 
assumption. Other approaches to dynamic assumption-based reasoning (eg [13, 44, 
12, 60, 61, 1, 52, 53, 49, 34, 69]) rely on a finite hypotheses space, which is either 
pre-specified (usually in this case it is referred to as assumption pool) and is explored 
dynamically, or is identified dynamically by goal-driven generation, i.e. the agent has 
specific conclusions that it wants to derive and identifies what assumptions are re­
quired in order to perform its derivations. Our approach enables agents to be more 
‘independent’ and ‘open-minded’ (one might say more like humans). At the same 
time, though, this means that we need to make provision for the management of this 
infinite space of assumptions.
There are three aspects to managing the space of hypotheses:
(i) How do we ensure that the set of hypotheses that an agent uses to draw a conclu­
sion is consistent, and that the possible world models that the agent infers are ra­
tional?
(ii) How do we restrict the space of hypotheses, when this is imperative, due to con­
straints that arise from a particular application domain?
(iii) Is the order in which an agent identifies and employs hypotheses important, i.e. 
does it affect what conclusions it may draw, whether these are rational, and the 
extent to which the agent bases its reasoning on reality rather than wishful think­
ing?
We discuss each of these issues in turn, now.
15
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:36:02 EET - 137.108.70.7
4.3.1 Hypotheses Rationality and Consistency
One may argue that following Reiter’s original computation of extensions within DfT 
we may compute possible world models that are counter-intuitive: for instance, in our 
example above, BA would infer an extension which suggests that BA infers a possible 
version of the world, in which it bears an obligation to pay sa, although no delivery 
from sa is explicitly recorded in this world, and similarly that sa bears an obligation 
to deliver, although this world does not explicitly record that ba’s order is valid (best- 
guess reasoning). This view of extensions, separated from assumptions, as possible 
world models, is clearly undesirable. To overcome this problem we may employ 
Constrained Default Logic (CDfL) [67] and require joint consistency of default as­
sumptions. The possible world model that the agent infers incrementally, for a Con­
strained Default Theory (CDfT), is the consistent set in(i)u-,out(i). This is tantamount to 
saying that the possible world models inferred by the agent contain, besides previous 
knowledge, both the consequents and the assumptions of the applied defaults.
Moreover, note that it is important to consider the issue of consistency between as­
sumptions employed during the reasoning process and new inferences derived as a 
result of the reasoning process. One of the reasons for which it is impossible to resort 
to proof for the construction of the DfT, is precisely because we need a revision 
mechanism in order to reconstruct the default rules as new information becomes 
available, so that the agent could prove literals from its updated knowledge, and 
hence identify them correctly as prerequisites or justifications, i.e. candidate assump­
tions. By constructing lattice structures we dispense of the requirement to revise the 
defaults. This is because inference on the lattice structure involves one level at a time 
in a step-wise manner, and should new information become available, the agent can 
move upwards or downwards to the required level of the lattice. Incidentally, in this 
way it is also guaranteed that during its inference, the agent will employ the fewest 
possible hypotheses, i.e. the conclusions it derives at any given time are committed to 
its current knowledge to the largest possible extent, and it only makes assumptions 
when it really has to.
4.3.2 Hypotheses Restriction
It may be risky for an agent to employ assumptions in full freedom. Full autonomy in 
assumption identification may be unsafe and lead to undesirable situations such as 
lack of control, unpredictable effects and counter-intuitive worlds. Thus, a mecha­
nism capable of motivating and adjusting the agents’ hypothetical reasoning is really 
essential.
For this purpose, we see that DfL’s syntax and semantics can be really helpful. Re­
call that during its reasoning, the agent computes the extension of its theory incre­
mentally and at each step i of the reasoning process constructs the set ln(i), which con­
tains all previously available knowledge together with any new derived knowledge. 
The Out(i) set computed at each step of this reasoning process contains formulae that 
should not turn out to be true i.e., the negation of formulae that are employed as as­
sumptions. By initializing the Out set appropriately, we may control the agent in its 
identification and deployment of assumptions, and hence we may control its auton-
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omv. Here are some possible scenarios, for the example discussed in section 3 with 
the same initial knowledge (w) but with different initializations of the Out set. 
o if w = in(0) = {X,, X2} and Out(O) = py then extension in(i) = {X,, x2, y,} is computed by 
applying only Dio., default (out(i) = (Yjj). No assumptions are possible due to the 
initial restriction on what can be inferred.
o if w = {X,, x2, X3} and out(O) = {x,, x5} then extension in(i) = {x,, x2, x3, y,} is computed by 
applying only Di0-1 default (out(i) = {X,, X5}). Again no assumptions are possible due 
to the initial restriction on what can be assumed.
o if w = {X,, X3, x,, Xs} and Out(O) = {X2l Y2} then no extension is computed due to the 
initial restriction on what can be inferred and assumed.
A question that arises naturally is ‘What kind of information can be used to restrict 
the assumption space?’. The answer is simple: ‘Any kind of information!’. And this 
answer is what is really important in our proposal. It means that we are able to use all 
available notions that our representation language supports. For instance, we may 
include information about actions and time, deontic notions, physical and legal abil­
ity, roles, beliefs, etc. Such information may relate to the agent itself, other agents or 
the environment.
The next question that arises is “How must we initialize the out(i) set?”. We may use 
a Preconstrained Default Theory (PcDfT). A PcDfT is a triple of the form (W, D, PC), 
where (w. D) is a CDfT and pc is set of formulae that are considered as the constraints 
of the theory [68], For the first step of the process, i.e., for i=i, in(0)=w and Out(O) = pc. It 
is clear that, the role of preconstraints is identical to the role of the Out(i) set in initial­
izing and adjusting agents’ hypotheses. By initializing the pc set appropriately, an 
agent may specify and apply a certain strategy in its reasoning. Note that the formulae 
contained in PC define what the agent concedes or expects, and not factual knowl­
edge. For this reason it is separated from w.
For example, in case of incomplete knowledge about the CA's validity to perform de­
livery and to accept payment on delivery, BA should make some assumptions in order 
to proceed with inference. A risky agent may accept that ca is legally (and practically, 
obviously) empowered to perform delivery and accept payment, thus the validity of 
the corresponding actions could be assumed. On the other hand, a cautious agent may 
accept the assumptions regarding the action of delivery but not regarding the action of 
accepting payment. To model this cautious strategy the agent may insert into pc that 
legal power or validity of ca to receive payment holds.
4.3.3 Hypotheses Sequence
A question that arises during assumption-based reasoning is what is the reasonable 
sequence for employing assumptions? We believe that this question and its answer 
are strongly related to causality.
We may use stratification for a Default Theory (DfT) [10, 11] or for its two variants 
(CDfT and PcDfT) [4], A DfT is called stratified (SDfT) iff there exists a stratifica­
tion function s that assigns a natural number to each default. As a result of the appli­
cation of a stratification function the set of default rules is ordered into strata. If the 
consequent of a rule D is used by another rule D' then we apply D before D' i.e..
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s(D)<s(D·). The formal characterization of this property for any defaults D and D' is as
follows:
if prop(cons(D)) n prop(pre(D·) u just(D")) * 0 then s(D) <s(D·) 
if prop(oons(D)) n propfconsfD')) * 0 then s(D) =s(D·)
where pre(D), just(D) and cons(D) denote the prerequisites, justifications and consequents 
of D, respectively, and prop(D) denotes the set of all propositional atoms occurring in D 
[4], According to this definition d and D‘ are mapped into different strata because 
s(D)<s(D') holds. In this way, an agent ensures that D applies before D’ and the causal 
relation between the two rules is not lost.
Note that the way in which agents construct lattice structures, as per our proposal, 
resembles, in a way, stratification of a DfT [10]. The possible default formulations of 
each initial norm are assigned to the various lattice levels, depending on the number 
of assumptions that each default formulation employs. That is, the number of assump­
tions may be regarded as somewhat similar to a stratification criterion applied to the 
set of possible default formulations for each initial norm.
The question that arises naturally, now, is how these two distinct ordering methods 
(one due to stratification and one due to the number of assumptions) relate to each 
other. Stratification aims at preserving causal relations between defaults, while the 
organization of defaults into lattice structures aims at ensuring that agents employ the 
fewest possible hypotheses at each step of their reasoning process, and thus base their 
conclusions on facts as much as possible, rather than on assumptions. The set of lat­
tices that the agent possesses may be subjected to stratification, so that the agent 
chooses a reasonable order in which to apply default rules, and preserve any causal 
relations between defaults. Once a particular lattice, belonging to a particular stratum, 
is chosen, the agent establishes which node of the lattice corresponds to its current 
knowledge base (and therefore assumption requirements). Note that the agent may 
use different levels of different lattices. The precise level to be used in each lattice is 
determined by its current knowledge. The precise lattice to use at each point is deter­
mined by the stratification function. In this way an agent infers some knowledge, 
even on a (partially or totally) hypothetical basis, which causes the entailment of 
other knowledge in an argumentation-like manner (cf [57]) and we may characterize 
its conclusions in the same way that is used to characterize arguments (e.g. defeasi­
ble). To illustrate this, let us assume the previous normative system containing the 
norms Ri and R2 enhanced with two additional norms R3 and R4 of the form:
R3=x2<- X6 and R4=X6< -X7/ X,
The corresponding lattices’ levels for norms R3 and R4 contain the defaults:
Lattice for R3:
Level 0Μ: {D30., = Xe: true /X2}
Level 1M: {D3,., = true : Xs/ x2} 
Lattice for R4.
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Level 0R4: {D40., = X7]Xe: true /X5}
Level 1R4: {Ε^,.^χ,ιΧβ/Χϋ, D4,i2 = xe:x7/x5}
Level 2R4: { D42i1 = true : X7,Xe/ X5 }
Under SDfL it is clear that R3 and Ri as well as R4 and R2, are mapped into different 
strata because Ri and R2 use the consequents of norms R3 and R4, respectively, either 
in the prerequisites or the justifications sets. Here are some possible scenarios, with 
different initial knowledge available each time, in the beginning of the reasoning 
process:
o if w=in(0)=pq, Xe, X3} and out(O)=0 then extension in(4)={X,, Xc, x3. x2, y,, Xs, y2} is com­
puted by making the assumption that X7, Xe and x, hold (Out(4)={- X7l - Xe, -X4) and by 
applying defaults D30i,, di0i1, D4^ and D2U respectively. Note that, in this case, the 
agent first infers X5 on the assumption of X7, Xe and later infers Y2 only on the as­
sumption of X4, while it uses its previous decisions towards this scope.
o if w=in(0)={X,, x2, X3, x7, Xe} and Out(O)=0 then extension in(3)={ x,, x2, Xe, x7, Xe, Yi, Xs, Ye} is 
computed by making the assumption that X4 hold (Out(3)={-x„}) and by applying de­
faults Dio.i, D4q,i and D2i.2 respectively. Note that, in this case, there is no reason for 
an agent to use any of the two possible default formulations for the initial norm 
R3, because this norm adds no useful information to its knowledge base.
To sum up, we see that, an agent, when uses stratification on the set of available lat­
tice structures and then performs its reasoning within the lattices, does not miss any 
causal knowledge and avoids employing unhelpful assumptions.
5 Examples
So far in our discussion, we have used abstract examples, in order to facilitate focus­
ing on concepts rather than the particulars of a specific domain of application. Here 
we illustrate the points raised in the preceding discussion, with reference to the e- 
commerce example presented in section 2.1, although it is, of course, more generally 
applicable to other open multi-agent scenarios, where agents have to reason with 
incomplete or inconsistent knowledge and their behaviour is regulated by some norms 
(e.g. cooperative distributed problem solving, task allocation etc).
5.1 Dealing with information gaps (1H)
Single-agent Autonomous Reasoning
Assume that the initial set of contract norms for the agreement between ba and sa 
may contain two rules, Ri and R2, among others. Ri states that agent2 is obliged to 
deliver to agenti if agenti orders from agent2 and the transaction is successfully com­
piled. R2 states that agenti is obliged to pay agent3 who acts on behalf of agent2 if agenti 
orders from agent2, agent3 delivers the products to agenti and agent3 is empowered to 
accept payment from agenti on behalf of agent2.
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R = {R1= lsObligedToDelivern(agent2,agent1) <- OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2) a E-shopFunctionsWell,
R2 m lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2) <- OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2) λ
DeliversTo(agent3,agerrt1)
λ lsErnpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1 ,agent2)
}
Note that these norms are syntactically identical to the norms considered in the ex­
ample presented in section 3. Thus, the corresponding lattices of candidate default 
formulations for each one coincide with the lattices shown in section 3, i.e. they are 
as follows:
Lattice for ri :
Level 0: {Di0,, =
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), E-shopFunctionsWell : true/ lsObligedToDelivem(agent2,agent1) }
Level 1: {Di1t1 =
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2) : E-shopFunctionsWell / lsObligedToDelivern(agent2,agent1),
Dlu*
E-shopFunctionsWell: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2) / lsObligedToDelivern(agent2,agent1) }
Level 2: {0ΐΜ«
true : OrdersFrom(agent1 ,agerrt2), E-shopFunctionsWell / lsObligedToDelivern(agent2,agent1) }
Lattice for R2:
Level 0: {Ο2ο,,=
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), 
lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent11agent2)
: true
/ lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2) }
Level 1: {D2,,, *
OrdersFrom(agent1 ;agent2), DeliversTo(agent3, agentl)
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lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agerit3,agent1,agent2)
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOffagentl ,agent3,agent2),
D2,.2 *
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agentl,agent2) 
: DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)
/ lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2),
D2,.3 =
DeliversTo(agent3,agentl), lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1 ,agent2)
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2)
/ !sObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2) }
Level 2: { D22i1 »
OrdersFrom(agent1 ,agent2)
: DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), lsEmpowerecfToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfDf(agent3,agent1,agent2)
/ lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2),
D2,.,b
DeliversT o(agent3,agent1)
: OrdersFrom(agentl,agent2), lsEmpowerecfToAcceptPaynnentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) 
/ lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2),
D2j,3 =
IsEmpoweredT oAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1 ,agent2)
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)
/ lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2) }
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Level 3: {D23.i =
true
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), 
lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)
/ lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2) }
Suppose that the initial knowledge for agent BA is W={ OrdersFrom(BA.SA), E- 
shopFunctionsWeii}, that is, ba knows that it placed an order, and that the electronic trans­
action compiled successfully. BA employs the default formulation Dio.i for norm m 
and it may only infer that sa is obliged to deliver products, on the basis of this knowl­
edge, without resorting to any assumptions. But there are cases where BA needs to 
perform:
o best-guess reasoning i.e., the agent needs to plan its fiiture activities on the as­
sumption that certain events/actions will occur, and that its partners’ actions will 
be valid. For instance, consider that BA has just ordered successfully from sa and 
also knows that ca is empowered to accept payment on behalf of sa, i.e., its cur­
rent knowledge is:
W = ln(0) = { OrdersFrom(BA,SA), E-shopFunctionsWell, IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBe- 
halfOf(CA,BA,SA) }
In order to infer that it might find itself bearing an obligation to pay at some fu­
ture time (and plan to have adequate funds available), it needs to assume that CA 
will deliver on time, i.e., that DeiiversTo(ca,BA). In this case the agent uses the for­
mulation Dio.i for norm ri and the formulation D2i,2 for norm R2.
o no-risk reasoning, i.e., even though the agent may not know everything about the 
past and present, it may need to infer information, in order to protect itself from 
an undesirable situation in the future. For instance, consider that ba knows that it 
has just ordered successfully from sa and that ca delivered the goods to it, but it 
does not know explicitly whether ca is legally empowered to accept payment on 
behalf of sa, i.e., its current knowledge is:
W = ln(0) = {OrdersFrom(BA,SA), E-shopFunctionsWell, DeliversTo(CA,BA) }
In order to proceed and pay ca (and avoid finding itself in a situation where its 
payment is overdue) ba must be able to infer its obligation to pay ca, and this is 
possible only by resorting to the assumption that ca is legally empowered to ac­
cept payment on behalf of SA., i.e. that IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehal- 
fOf(CA,BA,SA). In this case the agent uses the default formulation Dio.i for norm Ri 
and the formulation D2i,t for norm R2.
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Now, let us see an example where it is desirable, for some reason, to restrict the as­
sumption space. What if we wanted our agent ba to avoid assuming that some agent is 
legally empowered to act as a representative for another agent in matters of payment? 
Then the Out(O) set (this is the set of pre-specified constraints, PC, that was mentioned 
earlier) must be initialized to contain the forbidden assumption:
PC=Out(0) = {lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehaHOf(agent3,agentl ,agent2)}
Now it is impossible for ba to employ the above assumption, that is, it will only use 
the formulation Di 0,1 of norm Ri.
The Out set may, also, be initialized to contain rales in order to restrict the assump­
tion space. For example, ca must not be assumed to be empowered to accept payment 
on behalf of SA, if either sa or ca is a debtor. Then the Out(O) set must be initialized to 
contain the forbidden assumption, which in this case takes the form of a rule:
PC=Out(0) = {lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) <- Debtor(agent2),
IsEmpowerecTT0AcceptPaymentFramOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1 ,agent2) <- Debtor(agent3)
}
Recall that when the Out set contains a literal, the intended semantics is that it 
should not be assumed. When the Out set contains a rale, the intended semantics is 
that, if the rule conditions hold, then the rale conclusion should neither be assumed 
nor concluded during inference, i.e, rales in the Out set act as constraints. Each condi­
tion in such a constraint may be known to the agent, i.e. it may be the case that it is 
explicitly contained in its initial knowledge, or it may be inferred during the reason­
ing process, or it may be assumed during the reasoning process.
Multi-agent Autonomous Reasoning
Consider now that the initial set of norms for the agreement between ba and sa con­
tains, in addition to ri and R2, norm R3, which states that agent2 is obliged to accept 
payment from ageni3 on behalf of agerrtl if agent3 delivers the products to agentl, agentl 
pays for the products to agent3 and agent3 is empowered to accept payment from agentl 
on behalf of agent2.
R = { RI $ IsObligedToDeliverTo (agent2,agent1) <- OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2) λ E-shopFunctionsWell,
R2 = IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOffagentl ,agent3,agent2) <- OrdersFrom(agent1 ,agent2) λ
DeliversTo(agent3,agentl) λ
IsEmpoweredToAcceptPay mentFromOnBe ha lfOf(agent3, agentl, agent2), 
R3s lsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agentl) <- DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)A
Pays(agent1,agent3) λ
IsEmpoweredToAcce ptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agentl,agent2)
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}The corresponding lattices are as follows:
Lattice for R1:
Level 0: { di0.i =
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), E-shopFunctionsWell: true / lsObligedToDelivem(agent2,agent1) }
Level 1: {Di,., *
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2) : E-shopFunctionsWell / lsObligedToDelivern(agent2,agent1),
D1U-
E-shopFunctionsWell: OrdersFrom(agent1 ,agent2) / lsObligedToDelivern(agent2,agent1) }
Level 2: {di2,,=
true : OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), E-shopFunctionsWell / lsObligedToDelivem(agent2,agentl) }
Lattice for R2:
Level 0: {D20.,s
OrdersFrom(agent1,agerrt2), DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), 
lsEmpowerecfToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehaltOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)
: true
/ lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2) }
Level 1: {D2,., a
OrdersFrom(agent1, agent2), DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)
: lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1 ,agent2)
/ lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2),
D2,.2S
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), lsEmpowerecTToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent31agent1,agent2) 
: DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)
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/ lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2),
D2i.3 =
De!iversTo(agent3,agentl), lsEmpowerecTToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1 ,agent2)
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2)
/ lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2) }
Level 2: {D22,,=
OrdersFrom(agent1 ,agent2)
: DeliversTo(agent3,agentl), lsEmpowerecTToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agentl,agent2) 
/ lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2),
D2„s
DeliversTo(agent3,agentt)
: OrdersFrom(agentl,agent2), lsEmpowerecfToAa;eptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) 
/ lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2),
D2j.3 =
IsEmpoweredT 0AcceptPaymentFramOnBehalfOf(agent3, agentl, agent2)
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), DeliversTo(agent3,agentl)
/ lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2) }
Level 3: { D23i, =
true
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), DeliversTo(agent3,agentl),
IsEmpoweredT oAcx;eptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agerrt3,agentl ,agent2)
/ lsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2) }
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Lattice for R3:
Level 0: {Ο3ο.,=
DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), Pays(agent1 ,agent3))
a lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1 ,agent2)
: true
/ lsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1) }
Level 1: {D3, ,=
DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), Pays(agent1 ,agent3)
: lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)
/ lsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1),
D3i,2 a
DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), lsEmpoweredToAcoeptPaytTientFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) 
: Pays(agent1,agent3)
/ lsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1),
D3,.3*
Paysfagentl ,agent3), lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)
: DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)
/ lsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1) }
Level 2: {D32., *
DeliversTo(agerrt3,agent1)
: Pays(agent1,agent3), lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)
/ lsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1),
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D3222 =
Pays(agent1 ,agent3)
: DeliversTo(agent3,agentl), lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agentl,agent2)
/ lsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1),
D32.3 ξ
lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent11agent2)
: DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), Pays(agent1,agent3)
/ lsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1) }
Level 3: {D331e
true
: DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), Pays(agent1,agent3), 
lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2))
/ lsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1) }
In this case, agents BA and SA are subject to the same set of norms (the R set), and 
suppose that they possess different individual knowledge. Each of them needs to 
reason autonomously based on individual hypotheses, although they may share the 
same overall goal (e.g. to comply with the agreement).
We showed above (cf. the non-risk reasoning case) that if:
W®A = ln(0)BA= {OrdersFrom(BA,SA), E-shopFunctionsWell, DeliversTo(CA,BA)},
BA needs to assume that ca is empowered to accept payment on behalf of sa in order 
to infer its obligation to pay.
On the other hand, SA may possess this kind of knowledge due to its separate 
agreement with ca, so it does not need to make such an assumption. However, it may 
need to employ other assumptions. For instance, let sa know that BA ordered from it 
successfully, that ca delivered goods to ba, and that ca is legally empowered to accept 
payment from ba on its behalf, i.e.
w“= ln(0)SA= {OrdersFrom(BA,SA), DeliversTo(CA.BA), E-shopFunctionsWell,
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lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(CA,BA,SA)
}
Then in order to recognize whether its partner (ba) complies with the agreement 
(and consider this business transaction completed) sa needs to assume that ba per­
forms payment (Pays(BA, CA)), and this is possible with formulation D312 of norm R3.
In the same way that we may have multiple agents reasoning with the same current 
knowledge, using different assumptions, we may impose the same or different restric­
tions on their assumption spaces, by appropriate initializations of their respective Out 
sets.
5.2 Commitment to Assumptions (2H)
Consider, again, the same set of norms for the agreement between ba and sa which 
contains ri, R2 and R3. We showed above (cf. the non-risk reasoning case) that if:
WBA= ln(0)BA = {OrdersFrom(BA,SA), E-shopFunctionsWell, DeliversTo(CA,BA)},
in order to infer its obligation to pay, BA needs to assume that CA is empowered to 
accept payment on behalf of SA, i.e. lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(CA,BA,SA). 
This assumption, if employed at some time point, affects ba’s subsequent inferences. 
For example, in order to infer sa’s obligation to accept its payment via its representa­
tive (ca) as norm R3 states, ba only needs either to actually perform payment (Pays(BA, 
CA) will be rendered true in its knowledge base ) or to assume it, because it is still 
committed to its previous assumption about ca’s legal power. In other words, ba 
either needs to use the default formulation D30,i or the default formulation D32.i, from 
the lattice corresponding to norm R3.
5.3 Nonmonotonic Reasoning (3H)
Consider, again the same set of norms ri, R2 and R3, for the agreement between ba 
and sa, but now the Out(O) set contains the following rales that restrict the assumption 
space:
PC=Out(0)BA = {lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) <- Debtor(agent2), 
lsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1 ,agent2) <- Debtor(agent3)
}
If the initial knowledge for agent ba is:
W®A = 10(0)“= {OrdersFrom(BA,SA), E-shopFunctionsWell, DeliversTo(CA,BA)}
then ba may infer its obligation to pay (default formulation D2i,i) or sa’s obligation to 
accept its payment (default formulation D32t) on the basis of the assumption that CA is
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empowered to accept payment on behalf of sa (the conditions of the constraints con­
tained in the Out set are not satisfied).
Now imagine that at a later time point BA is informed that SA is indeed a debtor, i.e. 
Debtor(SA) is added to its current knowledge base. This new information affects its 
previously drawn conclusion. Now, ba needs to traverse the lattices downwards in 
order to choose an alternative formulation for the norms compatible with its current 
knowledge and any restrictions imposed on the assumption space. For example, BA 
had previously used the formulation D2t,i for norm R2 and the formulation D32,i for 
norm R3. Now that its knowledge base has expanded and contains new information, it 
traverses the corresponding lattices downwards from these nodes and reaches the 
formulations that lie at level 0 in each lattice, i.e. it retracts previously employed 
assumptions, along with any conclusions drawn on their basis. At this level, ba will 
not be able to continue the incremental computation of extensions.
6 The representation of e-Contracts in Event Calculus
To establish the state of a business exchange, given a history of parties’ actions, we 
may represent the agreement that regulates this exchange in some temporal logic, as 
we mentioned in the Introduction. In fact, such representations have been constructed 
for various types of agreements by many other researchers in Event Calculus (e.g. 
[46, 6, 20, 65] among others). The basic elements of the language are time points, 
fluents and actions or events. Fluents are factual and normative propositions whose 
truth-value alters over time, as a result of the occurrence of an action or an event.
For the example scenario that we introduced earlier, we adapted the simple EC 
formalism presented in [48], In its original form, the formalism does not distinguish 
between events that are brought about through agents’ actions, and force majeure 
events that are brought about independendy of the agents. We preserve the distinction 
and use the term ‘action’ to refer to the former, and ‘event’ to refer to the latter. A 
more detailed discussion of the representation that we constructed may be found in 
[24, 26], Here, we present the main points briefly, to offer the reader an idea of what 
such representations look like, and to motivate the ensuing discussion about the limi­
tations that we perceive in such representations.
We use terms, such as Order(agenti, agent2), for fluents that become true as a result of 
specific actions (here ordering AOrder(agerrti, agent2)). We use terms of the form 
op(agenti, agent2, action, time) for fluents that describe normative propositions and their 
intended reading is “agenti is in legal relation op towards agent2 to perform action by 
time”. The legal relation Op may be obligation, prohibition or permission; although 
these notions are typically formalized in some system of Deontic Logic, we merely 
use them as descriptive names for fluents, and do not adopt any specific Deontic 
Logic axiomatization.
As [45, 6] note, the effects of an action apply only when the action is considered 
valid, and this, in turn depends on whether its agent has the legal and practical ability 
to perform it. An agent’s legal and practical ability with respect to certain actions may 
be time-dependent, so we use the fluents iPowerfagent, action) and PAbiiity(agent, action) re­
spectively, and the fluent Vaiid(agent, action) to denote that an action performed by an
29
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:36:02 EET - 137.108.70.7
agent is valid. We employ the six basic predicates of [48], shown in Table 1; of those, 
initiates and Terminates are used along with Happens in the specific description of a par­
ticular contract, to represent causal relations between fluents and actions/events. The 
other three are defined in a domain-independent manner. We have modified the origi­
nal definition of the HoidsAt predicate to take into account action validity, and have, 
consequently, extended the Happens predicate to include the agent of an action as an 
argument (for events, though, we use the original form of Happens).
Table 1 Basic Event Calculus Predicates
lnitiates(action, fluent, time) 
/Terminates(action, fluent, time)
fluent starts/stops to hold after action occurs at 
time.
lnitiates(event, fluent, time) 
/Terminates(event, fluent, time) fluent starts/stops to hold after event occurs at time.
HoldsAt(fluent, time) fluent holds at time.
Happens(agent, action, time) agent performs (instantaneous) action at time
Happens(event, time)
event occurs (instantaneously) at time
Clipped(time1, fluent, time2)
/ Declipped(time1, fluent, time2)
fluent is terminated/activated between timel and 
time2.
For illustration purposes, some domain-independent definitions are shown below:
Clipped(time1, fluent, time2) <- (Happens(agent, action, time) ATerminates(action, fluent, time)
λ timel < time<time2 λ HoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), time))
Declipped(time1, fluent, time2)«- (Happens(agent, action, time) λ lnitiates(action, fluent, time)
λ timels tlme<time2A HoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), time))
HoldsAt(fluent, time2) <- (Happens(agent, action, timel) λ Initiatesfaction, fluent, timel) Atime1<time2
a -Clipped(time1, fluent, time2) a HoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), timel))
-■HoldsAt(fluent, time2) <- (Happens(agent, action, time1)ATerminates(action, fluent, timel) a timel<time2
λ -’Declipped(time1, fluent, time2) a HoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), timel))
HoldsAt(fluent, time2)«- (HoldsAt(fluent, timel) a timel<time2 λ -Clipped(time1, fluent, time2))
"ΉοΜβΑΙΙίΙυβπΙ, time2) <- (HoldsAt(fluent, timel) a time1<time2 a -Oeclippedftimel, fluent, time2))
Note that the first definition for HoidsAt above reflects the establishment of a fluent 
as a result of an action, while the second one reflects the common sense law of iner­
tia. We do not show here the definitions of all the predicates with respect to event
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(rather than action) occurrence, but a reader familiar with EC may see what form 
these take easily.
As stated in section 3, the EC representation of an e-contract may be characterized 
as a triple (H, r, A). Specifically, H corresponds to historical information and is a (pos­
sibly empty/incomplete) set of definitions for predicates hl = {Happens, Holds}, r corre­
sponds to causal information and is a (possibly empty/incomplete) set of definitions 
for rl = {initiates, Terminates}, and A is the (non-empty) set of definitions for the domain- 
independent predicates Al= {HoldsAt, -.HoldsAt, Clipped, Declipped}, that is, A = {Υ<-Χ1λ...λΧι< I 
YeAL and x,eAle>Hi.uRiv_>Tl}1 where TL contains the first-order-logic predicates used to ex­
press temporal relations, i.e., TL={<, =, >, 2, <}. So, the complete language is HLwRLuALuTi..
6.1 Examples
Let us return to our example scenario, and consider that ba orders from sa at time 
point T. Here is an extract of the H, R and A sets of the EC representation for the 
agreement between ba and sa. Note that this information may be incomplete, i.e., an 
agent may possess only partial historical knowledge (here, ba knows that it ordered 
from sa at time point T) and partial causal knowledge (here, ba knows that placing an 
order imposes an obligation on the recipient of the order to deliver; it knows that this 
obligation is terminated/discharged successfully when delivery actually takes place; 
and it also knows that the occurrence of delivery imposes an obligation on itself for 
payment, which is terminated when payment is actually made):
HeA= { HappensfBA, AOrder(BA, SA), T)} 
rba = {
Rl a
lnitiates(AOrder(agent1,agent2),Obligation(agent2,agent1,ADelivery(agent2,agent1),  time1+10),time1) <-
Happens(agent1, AOrder(agent1, agent2), timel)
R2a
lnitiates(ADelivery(agent1,agent2),Obligation(agent2,agent1,APayment(agent2,agent1),timel), timel) <-
(Happens(agent1, ADelivery(agent1, agent2), timel) 
HoldsAt(Obligation(agent1, agentl, ADelivery(agent1, agent2), time2), timel)
timel <time2)
R3s
Termlnates(ADelivery(agent1,agent2),Obligation(agent1,agent2,ADelivery(agent1,agent2),time2),timel) <-
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(Happens(agent1, ADeliveryfagentI, agent2), time"!)
HoldsAt(Obligation(agent1, agent2, ADelivery(agent1, agent2), time2), timel)
timel stime2)
R4 =
Terminates(APayment(agent1,agent2),Obligation(agent1,agent2,APayment(agentl,agent2),time2),time) «-
(Happens(agent1, APayment(agent1, agent2), timel) 
HoldsAt(Obligation(agent1, agent2, APayment(agent1, agent2), time2), timel)
timel <time2)
}
A“ = {
A1 =
HoldsAt(Obligation(agent2, agentl, ADelivery(agent2, agentl), timel+10), time2) <-
Happens(agent1, AOrder(agent1, agent2), timel ) 
lnitiates(AOrder(agent1, agent2),Obligation(agent1, agentl,ADelivery(agent2, agentl),timel+10),timel) 
-■Ciipped(time1, Obligation(agent2, agentl, ADelivery(agent2, agentl), timel+10), time2) 
HoldsAt(Valid(agent1, AOrderfagentl, agent2)), timel)
timel <time2
A2 =
HoldsAt(Obligation(agent2, agentl, APayment(agent2, agentl), timel+21), time2) <-
Happensfagentl, ADelivery(agent1, agent2), timel) 
lnitiates(ADelivery(agent1, agent2),Obligation(agent2, agentl,APayment(agent2, agentl),timel),timel) 
-Clipped(time1, Obligation(agent2, agentl, APayment(agent2, agentl), timel+21), time2) 
HoldsAt(Valid(agent1, ADelivery(agent1, agent2)), timel)
timel <time2
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}With reference to this representation, and given BA's current knowledge, only rule 
Ri may actually be used for inference, since its conditions are satisfied, and so BA may 
only infer that:
lnitiates(AOrder(BA, SA), Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10), T)
But what if BA needs to perform best-guess or non-risk reasoning? In this case ba 
needs to identify rule conditions that it may use as assumptions, and we proposed that 
this is possible, if the initial set of contract rules are reformulated as default rules. 
Since many different formulations are possible for each contract rule, the agent need 
not commit (statically) to some specific one, and instead it may construct the lattice of 
possible default formulations, as we argued earlier. In this way, the agent will be able 
to use any of the possible formulations, depending on its currently available knowl­
edge, which changes over time; essentially the agent will be identifying candidate 
assumptions dynamically.
As a result the agent constructs the following DfT (W* , dbs):
WBA = {Happens(BA, AOrder(BA, SA), T)},
that is, W8' contains the historical information available to the agent, and dba is the set 
containing the corresponding lattices of default formulations for each rule contained 
in the R8* and A8* sets.
Now, BA is able to perform both no-risk and best-guess reasoning by employing 
some of these defaults. For example, in the absence of information to the contrary, it 
may assume that its order is a valid action and that sa’s obligation to deliver is not 
unexpectedly terminated, in order to infer that SA bears an obligation to deliver the 
ordered goods. BA may come to this conclusion by employing in its inference the 
defaults dri and dai, respectively, and by computing the in and Out sets as shown be­
low4:
DR1 *
HappensfBA, AOrder(BA,SA), T)
true
lnitiates(AOrder(BA SA), Obligation(SA,BA,ADelivery(SA,BA), T+10), T)
4 Note that in our example time is discrete. So agents may generate past or future time points in 
order to make their assumptions. The only requirement for agents when assuming the exis­
tence of time points is to position each new time point in the overall time sequence, by intro­
ducing their temporal relation to other, known or assumed, time points.
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DAI «
Happens(BA, AOrder(BA, SA), T), 
lnitiates(AOrder(BA,SA), 
Obligation(SA,BA,ADelivery(SA,BA),T+10),T)
->Clipped(T, Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10),T1),
HoldsAt(Valid(BA, AOrder(BA, SA)), T), T < T1 
HoldsAt(Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10), T1)
ln(2) = W" u { lnitiates(AOrder(BA, SA), Obligation(SA, BA ADeiiveryfSA, BA), T+10), T),
HoldsAt(Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10),T1),
}
Out(2)“ = w“u{ Clipped(T, Obligation(SA BA, ADelivery(SA BA), T+10), T1), 
-> HoldsAt(Valid(BA, AOrder(BA, SA)), T), -■ (T< T1)
}
In the same spirit, and on the assumptions that: sa’s delivery will happen at some 
time point; such delivery will be valid; the effect of such delivery will be an obliga­
tion for BA to pay; and, finally, that such obligation will not be terminated by some 
other action, BA may infer what its potential payment period will be, relative to the 
time point of its assumptions. BA may come to this conclusion by employing in its 
inference the defaults DR2 and DA2, respectively, and by computing the in and Out sets 
as shown below5:
DR2 =
true
Happens(SA, ADel'ivery(SA BA), Τ’),
HoldsAt(Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10), T), Τ’ sT’ 
lnitiates(ADelivery(SA,BA),Obligation(BA,SA,APayment(BA,SA), Τ’), Τ’)
5 Note that the use of time point T is possible under the assumptions that T1< T < T2 and Γ <
T+10.
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DA2 η
true
HappensfSA, ADelivery(SA, BA), Τ'), 
lnitiates(ADelivery(SA, BA), 
Obligation(BA,SA,APayment(BA,SA), Τ'), Τ'), 
-’Clipped(time3, Obligation(BA, SA, APayment(BA, SA), Τ'), T2), 
HoldsAt(Valid(SA, ADelivery(SA, BA)), Τ'),
Τ' <T2
HoldsAt(Obligation(BA, SA, APayment(BA,SA), Τ'), T2)
ln(2)“ = W®* u { lnitiates(ADelivery(SA,BA), Obligation(BA, SA, APayment(BA, SA), Τ’), Τ’), 
HoldsAt(Obligation(BA, SA, APayment(BA, SA), Τ', T2)
}
Out(2) ®* = W®* u { -> Happens(SA, ADelivery(SA, BA), Τ’),
-■ HoldsAt(Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10), Τ'), -> (T'sT),
-· Happens(SA, ADelivery(SA, BA), Τ’),
-> lnitiates(ADelivery(SA,BA),Obligation(BA,SA,APayment(BA,SA), Τ'), Τ'), 
Clipped(time3, Obligation(BA, SA, APayment(BA, SA), Τ’), T2),
-> HoldsAt(Valid(SA, ADelivery(SA, BA)), Τ'), -> (T’< T2)
}
We may wish to restrict the assumption space. Suppose we wanted our agent BA to 
avoid assuming the validity of actions, and use information about action validity only 
when it explicitly knows about it. In this case, the Out(O) set (the set of preconstraints) 
must be initialized to contain the forbidden assumption. For example, in this case BA 
constructs a PcDfT where the pc set contains the following formula:
PC®A = Out(O) ®* = {HoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), time)}
Now, neither DAI nor DA2 defaults may be employed in the inference process.
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Consider, again the same initial knowledge and the same set of rules in H, R and A 
sets, for the agreement between BA and sa, but, now, with the restriction that if some 
agent is a known debtor, then all obligations that hold towards it are terminated, from 
the time point at which it becomes known that the agent is a debtor, onwards.
PC6* = Out(O) “ = { Clipped(time1, Obligation(agent1, agent2, action(agent1, agent2), time2), time2) «-
HoldsAt(lsADebtor(agent2), timel) λ timel <time2
}
With w8* = {Happens(BA, AOrder(BA, SA), T)} BA may, initially, perform both no-risk and 
best-guess reasoning by employing assumptions as shown above. Now imagine that a 
later time point T, BA is informed that SA is a debtor, i.e. HoidsAt(isADebtor(SA), Τ') is added 
in its knowledge base. This new information affects its previously drawn conclusion. In this 
case, ba needs to traverse the lattices downwards in order to retract its earlier assump­
tions and conclusions, and, if necessary, to choose alternative default formulations, 
compatible with its current, updated, knowledge.
As noted earlier, in section 4.3, following Reiter’s original computation of exten­
sions of a DfT we may compute possible world models that are counter-intuitive: for 
instance, in our example above, ba would infer, after applying all of dri, DR2, dai and 
DA2, the extension:
ln(4) = W8* u { lnitiates(AOrder(BA, SA), Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10), T), 
HoldsAt(Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10), T1), 
lnitiates(ADelivery(SA,BA), ObligationfBA, SA, APayment(BA, SA), Τ’), Τ'), 
HoldsAt(Obligation(BA, SA, APaymentJBA, SA), Τ'), T2)
This extension seems to suggest that ba infers a possible version of the world, in 
which it bears an obligation to pay SA, although no delivery from SA is explicitly re­
corded in this world, and similarly that sa bears an obligation to deliver, although this 
world does not explicitly record that ba’s order is valid. As we explained earlier, in 
section 4.3, if we employ Constrained Default Logic the assumptions employed by an 
agent at some time point constrain its future inferences, as we require joint consis­
tency of assumptions. Moreover, if we use Stratified Default Logic, we ensure that 
assumptions are employed in a rational sequence, knowledge about causal relations 
between rules is preserved, and the agent resorts to assumptions only when it really 
has to do so.
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7 Related Work
We noted in the introduction that in addressing assumption-based reasoning in open 
agent systems, one must essentially address the following questions:
1H. What assumptions are applicable to fill in information gaps, i.e., what can be 
assumed by an agent to be true or false at different time points?
2H. What is the relationship between assumptions and new knowledge, i.e. how do 
the adopted assumptions affect future inferences, either enabling some or dis­
abling others?
3H. What happens when new information becomes available, i.e., how does new 
information affect previously drawn conclusions?
Work within the assumption-based reasoning community focuses on issue (1H), 
only, and we review some of the main proposals in this section, in order to put for­
ward the main difference between this work and ours. There is also work within the 
nonmonotonic reasoning community, which is predominantly focused on questions 
(2H) and (3H), and does not address the issue of dynamic identification of assump­
tions satisfactorily.
7.1. Assumption-based reasoning
During the past twenty years various approaches to assumption-based or hypothetical 
reasoning have been proposed. These can be broadly grouped into : 
o those that rely on a priori specification of the assumptions that can be employed 
during the reasoning process, i.e., those where assumption identification is static; 
and
o those that claim to support ad hoc identification of potentially useful assumptions 
during the reasoning process, that is those that purport to identify and employ as­
sumptions dynamically.
One of the most notable approaches that fall into the static assumptions category is 
Doyle’s Truth Maintentance System [19], which was subsequently revised and ex­
tended by de Kleer’s Assumption-Based Truth Maintenance System [15, 16], which 
dealt with Horn clauses and tagged each inference with the assumptions and justifica­
tions that support it. Reiter and de Kleer later extended this proposal to deal with 
clauses that are more general than Horn clauses ([64], [17]). In another study, Kohals 
et al. in [37, 2] extended the propositional assumption-based model with probabilities 
and produced the Assumption-based Evidential language. Additionally, Poole’s 
Theorist is implemented in Prolog and relies on a modification to classical logic to 
achieve default reasoning [54, 55, 56], Bondarenko et al, [7] take an argumentation 
view. Kowalski and Sadri [38, 39] compare the Situation Calculus, which was pri­
marily designed for reasoning about hypothetical actions, and the Event Calculus, 
which is primarily intended for reasoning about actual events. In the same line, but 
with considerable differences, Provetti [59] also deals with the problem of actual and
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hypothetical actions in the context of the Situation Calculus and the Event Calculus. 
Florea’s [21] proposal is based on the TLI logic, which is a first-order logic enhanced 
with special notation to describe Reiter’s original default rules and assists in the deri­
vation of extensions. Finally, Tahara [70] addresses the issue of inconsistency that 
arises in the knowledge base due to inconsistent hypotheses and uses a preference 
ordering between hypotheses to resolve contradictions.
The most notable approaches that fall into the second category, where assumptions 
are supposed to be identified and employed dynamically, include those of Cox and 
Pietrzykowski [13], Reichgelt and Shadbolt [60, 61], Abe [1], Pellier and Fiorino [52, 
53], Jago [34] and Stamate [69]. Our work is, obviously, related mostly to this second 
category. However, it seems to us that assumption identification in these approaches 
is not truly dynamic. Before we discuss briefly each of these approaches, we make 
some general remarks on this issue:
Some of these approaches rely on the use of a pre-specified pool of assumptions, 
from which the agent must choose appropriate ones, whenever it identifies an infor­
mation gap and needs to fill it, in order to proceed with its reasoning. A natural ques­
tion that arises though, is whether it is realistic to expect that candidate assumptions 
can be identified in advance. It may be the case that in some application domains this 
is possible. However, in such cases, candidate assumption identification is not really 
dynamic, rather selection of an appropriate assumption from the pre-specified pool, 
may be carried out dynamically during the inference process. This selection though, 
requires deductive proof, which is notably computationally expensive. Other dynamic 
approaches that purport to support dynamic identification of assumptions, rely on 
finding appropriate assumptions in a goal-driven manner, that is, a particular conclu­
sion that the agent wants to derive is given, and then the agent identifies the assump­
tions that are required, in order for this conclusion to be derivable. In some cases, 
such goal-driven identification of candidate assumptions requires proof. But more 
importantly, the problem that we perceive with purely goal-driven assumption identi­
fication is the following: although software agents, in general, are inherently goal- 
driven in planning their activity, their rationality (and consequently then performance 
measures) depends on the extent to which they are perceptive of their environment, so 
that they may exploit changes in it. A purely goal-driven identification of candidate 
assumptions does not leave much room for the agent to adapt to circumstances.
We now discuss briefly each of the other approaches on dynamic assumption iden­
tification and usage, with some additional comments on each of them:
Cox and Pietrzykowski in [13] explore the problem of the derivation of hypotheses 
to explain observed events. This is equivalent to finding what assumptions together 
with some axioms imply a given formula. This is similar to what we refer to as no- 
risk reasoning, i.e. the identification and usage of assumptions about the past. In this 
work, the identification of assumptions is essentially goal-driven, and it requires 
proof, in order to establish that the observed event is implied by what is known (the 
axioms) and what is assumed.
Reichgelt and Shadbolt in [60, 61] present a way to analyze planning as a form of 
theory extension. Theory extension enables an agent to add further assumptions to its 
knowledge base, in order to derive potential plans towards goal achievement. This is 
similar to what we refer to as best-guess reasoning, i.e. the identification and usage of
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assumptions about the future. Their approach requires the use of a pre-specified as­
sumption pool, where candidate assumptions are defined in advance, along with pre­
conditions for their usage. The selection of an appropriate assumption from this pool 
is conducted in a goal-driven manner and requires that the preconditions associated 
with the assumption may be deductively proved from the knowledge base. If multiple 
assumptions have preconditions that are satisfied, selection amongst them is per­
formed by checking them against pre-specified criteria, e g. parsimony (the assump­
tion with the fewest preconditions is selected) or generality (the more general as­
sumption is preferred).
Abe [1], also, deals with the problem of missing hypotheses for the explanation of 
an observation. He proposes a way to generate analogous hypotheses from the 
knowledge base when the latter lacks the necessary ones. His work extends [641. 
Hypothesis generation is done in two distinct steps: i) using first abduction and then 
deduction, candidate hypotheses are searched in the knowledge base, and ii) in case 
where such candidate assumptions do not exist in the knowledge base, analogous 
hypotheses are generated, by examining clauses in the knowledge base and the as­
sumption requirements that were identified in the previous step. Hypotheses are gen­
erated ad hoc during the inference process, by exploiting predefined analogy relation­
ships between clauses. This is an attractive approach, but it requires caution: in some 
applications it is difficult to define analogy relations between clauses, in advance; if 
no such definition for analogy is provided a priori, counterintuitive results may be 
produced: For instance, suppose that a buyer agent is obliged to pay a seller agent by 
some deadline, and that it actually proceeds to do so by cash deposit into the seller’s 
bank account. Although the action of paying via a cash deposit is analogous to the 
action of paying in cash (in the sense that they have the same practical effect, the 
seller agent ends up possessing the required funds), the contract that regulates the 
exchange between the two agents may dictate that only payment in some specific 
form is deemed as acceptable. The two distinct forms of payment that seem analogous 
in terms of practical effects, may have different legal effects: one will result in the 
successful discharge of the buyer’s obligation to pay the seller, while the other will 
result in a (technical) violation of this obligation.
Pellier and Fiorino in [52, 53] address Assumption-based Planning, and propose a 
mechanism by which an agent can produce “reasonable” conjectures, i.e. assump­
tions, based on its current knowledge. Any action precondition that cannot be proved 
from the knowledge base is considered to be a candidate assumption. A tentative plan 
(i.e. one that involves assumptions) becomes firm, and can be employed by the agent 
in order to achieve a specific goal, only when the agent can satisfy all of the conjec­
tures, and this requires the agent to regard them as sub-goals and produce plans for 
them in turn.
Jago [34] uses the notion of context in making assumptions. A context is the cur­
rent set of the agent’s beliefs. Nested contexts are used to model nested assumptions, 
and temporally ordered contexts are used to represent the agent’s set of beliefs as it 
changes over time. Assumptions are not identified a priori, but rather during the 
reasoning process, either by guessing or in a goal-driven manner.
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Finally, Stamate [69] uses a three-valued logic to express uncertainty in logic pro­
grams; this may be attributed to uncertain information, or to missing information, i.e. 
information that is not derivable using the current knowledge and program rules.
7.2. Nonmonotonic reasoning
The EC representation of a contract allows us to establish what factual and normative 
fluents are true at a given time point, through appropriate queries on the HoldsAt predi­
cate. This representation, though, does not allow us to reason with incomplete knowl­
edge dynamically.
There are various approaches to reasoning with incomplete knowledge, such as the 
Closed World Assumption [62], Circumscription [47], Logic Programs [22, 23], and 
Defeasible Logic [50], and in fact these have been explored by many researchers (for 
example, [46, 6, 20, 65, 71, 31, 50, 51] among others).
Closed World Assumption
Under the Closed World Assumption (CWA) [62], an atomic formula is assumed 
false, unless it is explicitly known to be true. When an agent that uses a (possibly 
incomplete) EC contract representation, coupled with CWA, makes assumptions, 
these concern the falsity of certain formulae, rather than their truth. That is, in ad­
dressing question (1H), CWA dictates that an information gap be treated as negative 
information (one might call this the ‘atheist’ stance). In many realistic scenarios, 
however, it is important to be able to make assumptions about the truth (rather than 
the falsity) of certain formulae, i.e., to treat information gaps for what they are (ab­
sence of definite information) as potentially positive information (one might call this 
the ‘agnostic’ stance). For instance, suppose that a buyer agent has a rule determining 
whether it bears an obligation to pay a seller agent. Some of the rule conditions may 
be whether the buyer placed an order with the seller, whether the goods that were 
ordered were, in fact, delivered, and if so, whether such delivery met all possible 
requirements (e g. the right quantity and quality of goods were delivered, to the right 
place of delivery, using the right delivery method, at the right time and so on). The 
buyer agent will assume that anything it does not know about explicitly is false, so if 
does not possess explicit information about one or more of these conditions, it will 
not infer that it bears the obligation to pay the seller agent through the application of 
the rule, and may infer, through CWA, that it does not bear such an obligation. The 
buyer agent, in this case, cannot exploit assumptions in order to perform no-risk or 
best-guess reasoning. Since any assumptions employed at some point of the inference 
process are not retained for future reference, there is no way to relate them to future 
inferences. Hence with CWA we cannot address (2H) satisfactorily. When new in­
formation becomes available, px>ssibly refuting some of the assumptions that were 
employed at earlier points in the inference process, there is no way to retract previ­
ously drawn conclusions, that is CWA does not address (3H) satisfactorily. Of 
course, one may argue that such questions can be addressed, in a domain-specific 
manner, via the use of special purpose predicates (e.g. by recording assumptions used 
during the inference of each specific conclusion). However, we argued that by resort-
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mg to Default Logic we obtain a more general-purpose solution to the problem of 
dynamic assumption identification, which is also compatible with our common intui­
tions.
C ircumscription
Circumscription [47] is a generalization of the CWA, and might be used instead of it 
(work described in [71] is in this direction). Here, special predicates are used, in order 
to denote abnormal (unexpected) events and effects of actions, and the inference 
strategy attempts to minimize abnormality. The agent possesses explicit information 
about abnormality, and the conclusions derived are those contained in the minimal 
models of the (augmented with special predicates about abnormality) knowledge 
base. It is now possible for the seller agent of our example above to perform best- 
guess and no-risk reasoning, for if it does not explicitly know that delivery was ‘ab­
normal’ in some sense (e.g. it never happened, or it happened at the wrong time, or 
the wrong quantity or quality of goods were delivered an so on), it will use its rule to 
infer that it has an obligation to pay. That is, the agent is able to treat an information 
gap as potentially positive (tme) information. However, Circumscription poses some 
other problems, acknowledged by other researchers, as well: First, it requires that we 
define abnormal events, effects of actions and the like, explicitly, and, also, that we 
distinguish each abnormal individual from other individuals, explicitly [8] (page 
222)]. Second, in order to decide which individuals to characterize as abnormal, we 
are required to anticipate the conclusions that we want to be able to derive [3] (page 
149)]. Finally, in addressing (2H) and (3H), Circumscription suffers from the same 
problems as CWA.
Logic Programs
The correspondence between Logic Programs (with stable model or answer set se­
mantics) and default theories has been established in [43], We might consider the EC 
contact representation as a (general) Logic Program, with stable model semantics 
[22], or as an extended Logic Program, with answer sets [23] - in fact, work de­
scribed in [31] and [51] adopt the former view. In both cases, entailment is goal- 
driven. In stable model semantics, given a logic program lp we define its reduction 
lpm with respect to a set of goal atoms M. A stable model may be computed following 
two steps. First, by removing all ground instances of rules contained in lp, that have 
in their body negative literals -·β, where BeM. Second, by removing all ground nega­
tive literals in the bodies of the rules that remain in lp. In answer sets semantics a 
similar procedure is used to compute the answer set of lp. Note that the elimination 
steps, described above, for the computation of a stable model or an answer set, pre­
suppose the rejection of all rales that either contradict the set of goal atoms, or are 
irrelevant with the goal and, furthermore, these steps presuppose the falsity of all 
assumptions. The absence of an atom A from a stable model of lp is taken to signal 
that A is false. The absence of an atom A from an answer set of an extended lp is taken 
to mean that A is unknown. In the light of the comments we made earlier, when dis­
cussing CWA, it seems to us that answer set semantics are preferable to stable model 
semantics, for they enable us to treat information gaps in a more open-minded way 
(the agnostic vs. the atheist stance). What we find problematic in both cases though.
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for the purposes of assumption-based reasoning (and specifically in relation to ques­
tion (1H)), is the fact that potential assumptions can only be spotted in a goal-driven 
manner. The agent needs to decide a priori what conclusion it wants to derive, in 
order to be able to identify which assumptions are essential to make, in order to be 
able to actually derive it.
Defeasible Losic
Finally, there is another approach to default reasoning with e-contracts, namely De­
feasible Logic [50], which is used by [30] and [51]. Defeasible Logic allows us to 
define which conclusions are retractable, by making a distinction between strict and 
defeasible rales. Knowing that some information is defeasible enables an agent to 
treat it as a potential assumption. A question that arises is whether it is possible to 
determine, a priori, during the construction of the rale base, what is and what is not 
defeasible. In some situations (such as the examples shown in [30] and [51]) we are, 
indeed, able to detennine this on the basis of some specific domain information. In 
this case though, the agent does not discover potentially useful assumptions for itself; 
rather it uses an implicitly pre-specified pool of assumptions. We can see a way out 
of this problem: we may adopt a more general view and consider all derived conclu­
sions as defeasible. Rule conditions that are themselves defined through defeasible 
rales, are defeasible. Rule conditions that are not defined through rules must be pro­
vided either as strict facts or as defeasible facts. The agent will treat anything that it 
does not know about as a potential assumption. However, in order to establish 
whether some information gap exists, it will need to carry out proof on its knowledge 
base (to determine which defeasible rales fire), which is computationally expensive.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
The work in this report is motivated from the need for hypothetical nonmonotonic 
reasoning in an e-commerce setting, which is the application area of our project, and 
more generally in normative systems, where realistically agents will have incomplete 
knowledge about their environment, and about other agents. The questions we seek to 
address is whether it is possible for agents to identify appropriate assumptions dy­
namically, how these assumptions affect subsequent inferences and what happens 
when new information that becomes available at some time point disproves employed 
assumptions. We argued that e-contracts could be represented as Default Theories 
and, at first, we proposed a theoretical way in which such theories could be con­
structed automatically from initial contract representations, e.g. Event Calculus-based 
contract representations. That proposal relied on determining what information could 
be proved from the agent’s knowledge base, in order to decide whether it would serve 
as an assumption or not. Afterwards, we proposed an incremental technique that can 
be used for this construction that enables the dynamic and ad hoc identification of 
candidate assumptions without resorting to proof. We presented a full Event Calcu­
lus-based contract representation and illustrate via examples the way the technique 
presented in this work addresses all three issues of interest (1H)-(3H) and supports e- 
contracts execution and performance monitoring. Moreover, note that, a contract
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representation as a Default Theory enables agents to manage normative conflicts, first 
by detecting conflicts in an extension or among distinct extensions and, second by 
applying dynamically priorities among rules that are based on various criteria. It is 
out of our scope to discuss normative conflict management in this work. A detailed 
discussion is available in our previous work [24, 26, 28], Finally, we noted some 
limitations of EC representations with respect to reasoning with incomplete knowl­
edge and discussed why various approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning, such as 
CWA, Logic Programs, Circumscription and Defeasible Logic, that could be used in 
conjunction with an EC contract representation seem unsatisfactory. In the same 
spirit, we discussed other approaches to assumption-based reasoning and the need for 
the ad hoc, dynamic, derivation of hypotheses.
We have developed a prototype implementation based on our previous idea to hy­
pothetical reasoning [25, 27], which translates initial propositional representations 
into propositional Default Theories. The prototype follows the specifications listed be­
low: (i) e-contract rales are represented as sentences of the form (1), (ii) extensions 
are computed in the manner presented in [5], i.e., by maintaining syntactically consis­
tent sets of formulae, (iii) normal defaults are not considered, (iv) the hierarchical strac- 
ture off all possible default formulations is constructed incrementally during the inference 
process, (v) the applicability of defaults is checked in the same order that initial rales are 
given, and (vi) in levels that contain more than one corresponding defaults for the same 
initial rale, i.e. level 1 to level max(ki)-l (is is r), the applicability of defaults is checked 
in the order that the defaults are placed in this level.
Our current work focuses on employing the ideas discussed in this report in our 
existing prototype implementation. Naturally we are, also, interested in extending our 
implementation so that it may translate FOL representations into Default Theories. 
Note that in an initial (FOL) Event Calculus representation, all variables are implicitly 
assumed to be universally quantified. So the question that arises for the translation is 
what is the appropriate quantification for the variables that appear in the resulting 
default rules. There are four major approaches (cf. [63, 42, 55, 35, 36]) to the seman­
tics of open Default Theories, and we have yet to investigate which one might be 
appropriate for computational purposes. Moreover, it is our intention to examine how 
the dynamic and ad hoc identification of candidate assumptions, as it is presented in 
this report, can be applied to other approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning such as 
Logic Programs and Defeasible Logic.
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